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Uniform comprehensive income taxation is a popular policy option.1 Advo-
cates of this tax argue not only that it is fair, but also that it is neutral
in terms of investment decisions. According to the well-known Johansson-
Samuelson Theorem (JST),2 if all kinds of capital are subject to the same
marginal tax rate and ￿scal depreciation allowances coincide with economic
depreciation, then investment strategies are una⁄ected by taxation.
It is worth noting that the JST has been proven in a partial-equilibrium
model. In this article we therefore aim to analyze the JST in general equi-
librium. To do so we refer to two streams of literature. The ￿rst one deals
with the JST and provides some generalizations of its basic results in partial
equilibrium. In particular, Fane (1987) and Richter (1988) prove that this
theorem holds even if the investment return and the resale value of capital
are stochastic. Moreover, Niemann (1999) shows that the JST holds in a
real-option setting.3 In a subsequent article, Niemann (2004) also proves
that neutrality is ensured even under tax rate uncertainty.4
The second stream of literature deals with the e⁄ects of taxation in general
equilibrium. Starting from the pioneering article by Domar and Musgrave
(1944),5 Kaplow (1994) has improved this topic by dealing with a govern-
ment￿ s ability to in￿ uence risk taking through portfolio investments as well
as through tax policy. He has shown that in this context, many partial
equilibrium results fail to hold. Quite recently, Abel (2007) has analyzed
both consumption-based and comprehensive income taxation in a determin-
istic general equilibrium model. He has shown that, while consumption-based
1Its popularity is, e.g., shown by the US Report of the President￿ s Advisory Panel on
Tax Reform (2005).
2The JST is the joint result of Johansson￿ s (1961, 1969) and Samuelson￿ s (1964) ￿nd-
ings. For a discussion of the JST see, e.g., Sinn (1987, ch. 5) and Lyon (1990).
3For a discussion on tax neutrality in a real-option setting see, e.g., Panteghini (2007).
4Another interesting result is that found by Hartwick et al. (2002), who identify a
depreciation rule that does not encourage extractive ￿rms to deviate from a laissez-faire
strategy.
5See also Bulow and Summers (1984) and Gordon (1985), who have analyzed the e⁄ects
of taxation on risk taking. In particular, Bulow and Summers (1984) have pointed out
that the asset price volatility can lead to a huge impact in terms of both revenue raising as
well as to distortions. On the other hand, Gordon (1985) has proven that, under certain
conditions, taxation has negligible impact on the equilibrium allocation and at the same
time, allows the collection of a large amount of revenue. For further details on this topic
see Devereux (2003).
1taxation is a neutral and powerful revenue-raiser, comprehensive taxation has
many shortcomings. In particular, he has shown that under a comprehensive
income tax, it is possible to ￿nd a neutral ￿scal depreciation allowance (in line
with that proposed by Hall and Jorgenson, 1971, and Boadway and Bruce,
1984), although de facto this rule leads to the collection of no revenue.6
In this article, we will merge these two streams of literature, and study
the JST in general equilibrium. We will show that the JST is violated, in
that its depreciation rule does not ensure tax invariance of both a ￿rm￿ s value
and market prices, unless quite restrictive conditions are met. Moreover, we
will also see that the neutral depreciation rule in general equilibrium su⁄ers
from implementation problems.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 introduces income
and interest rate risk and discusses the JST in partial equilibrium. Section 3
introduces a stochastic general equilibrium model and compares our ￿ndings
with those obtained in partial equilibrium. Section 4 summarizes our results
and discusses their policy implications.
2 The JST in a stochastic context
In order to understand the JST in a general equilibrium setting, we ￿rst need
to see under which conditions the JST holds in partial equilibrium. Let us
therefore focus on a representative ￿rm, that faces both income and interest
rate risk. Accordingly, let us introduce the following:
Assumption 1 From time t0 to time T, a representative ￿rm receives a cash
￿ow ￿ (t) that evolves according to the following stochastic process:







; ￿ (t0) = ￿0; (1)
where ￿￿ (t;￿) is the instantaneous expected growth, ￿￿ (t;￿) 2 Rk is the
instantaneous standard deviation of growth, dW Q (t) is a vector of indepen-
dent Wiener processes, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, and the
prime denotes transposition.
6Notice however that Abel￿ s (2007) zero-tax-revenue result crucially depends on the
technology introduced. In fact, he assumes that a ￿rm￿ s production function is linearly
homogeneous in capital and labor.
2Assumption 2 The spot interest rate evolves as follows:







; r(t0) = r0; (2)
where ￿r (t;r) is the instantaneous expected growth, and ￿r (t;￿) 2 Rk is the
instantaneous standard deviation of growth.
Assumptions 1 and 2 allow us to deal with both non-systematic and
systematic risk. The former is related to the ￿rm-speci￿c stochastic process
(1) and is embedded in the di⁄usion term ￿￿ (t;￿). The latter is due to the
volatility of the ￿nancial system, and is therefore embedded in the di⁄usion
term ￿r (t;r) of process (2). The instantaneous correlation between ￿(t) and




When cash ￿ ow and interest rate are not correlated, cash ￿ ow risk cannot
be completely diversi￿ed and therefore, process (1) also a⁄ects systematic
risk. We have no a priori on the sign of correlation.7 For simplicity, hereafter
we will omit all the functional dependences for drift and di⁄usion terms.
Let us next denote ￿ (s) and ￿ as the ￿scal depreciation allowance at time
s and the uniform tax rate levied on a ￿rm￿ s income, respectively. Under the
assumption that the relevant tax system is fully symmetric, a ￿rm￿ s after-tax
cash ￿ ow at time s is thus equal to [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (s) + ￿￿ (s)]. Therefore, a ￿rm￿ s
















t [:] is the expectation operator, conditional on the information avail-
able at time t, and under the risk neutral probability measure Q.8
7The correlation between cash ￿ ow and the interest rate is taken into account by
Berk et al. (1999). In their numerical simulations they assume a negative covariance
between a ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow and the spot interest rate. Their hypothesis ￿ts well with the
characteristics of manufacturing ￿rms. Indeed, as long as a manufacturing ￿rm is debt-
￿nanced, an increase in the interest rate is expected to reduce cash ￿ ow and vice versa.
On the other hand, banks are a remarkable example of positive correlation. In this case,
an increase in the interest rate is expected to raise both their spread margin and cash ￿ ow.
8In an arbitrage-free market, the value of any traded asset is given by the expected
present value of its future cash ￿ ows discounted with the risk-free interest rate, under the
risk-neutral probability. For further details on the risk-neutral probability see, e.g., Bj￿rk
(1998).
3A ￿rm￿ s value V￿ (t) can also be found as the solution of a partial dif-
ferential equation. Applying the Feynman-Ka￿ c theorem (see Bj￿rk, 1998,
pp. 59-60), the expected value V￿ (t) is the solution of the following partial
di⁄erential equation:































where ￿￿;￿, ￿r;￿, ￿￿;￿, and ￿r;￿ are the after-tax drift and di⁄usion terms of





Let us next introduce the zero-tax value function:











Again, applying the Feynman-Ka￿ c theorem, and di⁄erentiating (5) gives


































Using (4) and (6) we can ￿nd a depreciation rule that ensures the equality
V (t) = V￿ (t), 8t. Notice that the boundary conditions
V (T) = V￿ (T) = 0 (7)
9We can rewrite (4) as a well-known non-arbitrage condition:






that entails the equality between the after-tax return on a default-free asset, on the LHS,





measure a ￿rm￿ s after-tax cash ￿ ow and the expected change of value over the interval dt,
respectively.
4hold. This means that, irrespective of taxation, a ￿rm￿ s value is nil at time T.
Let us next equate the RHSs of Equations (4) and (6). We set V (t) = V￿ (t)
for t < T, and solve for ￿ (t): We therefore obtain the neutral depreciation
rule







































In other terms, we can say that neutrality holds if and only if the ￿scal
depreciation allowance satis￿es (8).
It is worth noting that if the drift and di⁄usion terms are una⁄ected by
taxation (i.e., ￿￿ = ￿￿;￿, ￿r = ￿r;￿, ￿￿ = ￿￿;￿, and ￿r = ￿r;￿), then (8)
reduces to the well-known JST depreciation rule:





t [dV (t)]: (9)
The equalities ￿￿ = ￿￿;￿, ￿r = ￿r;￿, ￿￿ = ￿￿;￿, and ￿r = ￿r;￿ are not only
su¢ cient but also necessary conditions. In fact, the ￿ve last terms of the
RHS of Equation (8), containing the derivatives of V (t) with respect to ￿ (t)
and r(t), are nil for any value of ￿ (t) and r(t) only if ￿￿ = ￿￿;￿, ￿r = ￿r;￿,
￿￿ = ￿￿;￿, and ￿r = ￿r;￿. Therefore, we can conclude that:
Lemma 1 The JST depreciation rule (9) guarantees tax neutrality if and
only if the drift and di⁄usion terms of state variables (r(t) and ￿ (t)) are
una⁄ected by taxation.
The condition of Lemma 1 implicitly holds in partial equilibrium setting.
As we will show however, in general equilibrium, the drift and di⁄usion terms
of the state variables can be distorted by taxation. Therefore, the condition
of Lemma 1 is not easily met.
53 A general equilibrium approach
In section 2 we have shown that the depreciation rule of the JST is valid if,
according to Lemma 1, the stochastic processes driving the state variables
(cash ￿ ow and interest rate) are una⁄ected by taxation. In this section
we show that such a condition may fail to hold in a general equilibrium
framework where: (i) cash ￿ ows are the endowments of economic agents, and
(ii) the interest rate is endogenously determined. In particular, we will ￿nd
a depreciation rule that ensures tax invariance of market prices. However,
this depreciation rule does not coincide with the JST depreciation rule (8),
unless harsher conditions are met.10
The representative consumer On the economy there is a representa-
tive consumer who fully owns the only ￿rm in the economy. Preferences
on the intertemporal consumption c(t) are described by a strictly increas-
ing and concave utility function, represented by e￿￿tU (c(t)), where ￿ is an
exogenously given time preference rate. Moreover, we assume that the ￿rm
distributes all the after-tax cash ￿ ow to the consumer. Using the notation of
section 2 we can therefore say that at any time t, the representative consumer
receives the dividend [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t)].
At time t0, the consumer maximizes the expected utility of his intertem-
poral consumption from time t0 to time T, under an intertemporal budget
constraint. Since the discounted value of all his future consumption must be


















where m(t0;t) is the kernel price (i.e., the stochastic discount factor), and
B (t) is the market value of a risk-free asset.
10This general equilibrium model mainly draws on Merton (1990), Gomes et al. (2003)
and Vasi￿ cek (2005). Notice that the quality of results does not change if we assume more
than one agent (see, e.g., Cvitani· c and Zapatero, 2004).
6Capital market We assume that there are n risky assets and one risk-free
asset. In the absence of taxation, the ￿nancial market is therefore described


















where IS is a diagonal matrix containing the asset prices (as in vector S (t)),
￿ is the vector of the expected returns on risky assets, and ￿ is the volatility
matrix.
In a general equilibrium framework, the values ￿, ￿, and r are endoge-
nously determined. By Walras￿law, however, we cannot determine these
three prices (￿, ￿, and r) univocally. According to the standard approach
(see, e.g., Cvitani· c and Zapatero, 2004, Part III), therefore we determine: (i)
the risk-free interest rate r, and (ii) the market price of risk ￿: Assuming the
existence of the left inverse of matrix ￿0, the market price of risk is therefore
equal to
￿ ￿ ￿
0￿1 (￿ ￿ r1); (13)
where 1 is a vector of 10s.11
Under the risk neutral probability measure (Q) the expected return of
any traded asset on the ￿nancial market must equate the risk-free interest















must hold. Moreover, notice that (14) must coincide with (11). Therefore,
equating the RHS of Equations (11) and (14) gives
r1dt + ￿
0dW




Q (t) = ￿
0￿1 (￿ ￿ r1)dt + dW (t): (15)
The stochastic process (15) shows that ￿, as de￿ned in (13), allows to switch
from the historical to the risk neutral probability measure (and vice versa).
11For further details see, e.g., Du¢ e and Zame (1989).
7In particular, it is possible to prove (see, e.g., Du¢ e, 1996, ch. 6) that the







The public sector The government levies a tax rate ￿ on comprehensive
income. The same tax rate ￿ is applied to:
1. risk-free asset return, and so the after-tax rate is
r￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)r;
2. risky asset returns, and so the after-tax returns are
￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
Given these results, we can write the after-tax market price of risk as
follows:
￿￿ = ￿
0￿1 (￿￿ ￿ r￿1)
= (1 ￿ ￿)￿
0￿1 (￿ ￿ r1) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
The di⁄usion matrix ￿ is una⁄ected by taxation because the tax is not
levied on the stock price but rather on the stock returns.
Let us next introduce the following:
Assumption 3 At any time, public spending is always equal to tax revenue,
and has no direct impact on the private sector (i.e., on consumers and ￿rms).
According to Assumption 3, taxation can be interpreted as simply being
a real drain on the economy (Aseaa and Turnovsky, 1998).12 Assumption 3
has two main implications. Firstly, the public budget constraint is always
in equilibrium and therefore, the government does not issue any public debt
12Assumption 3 is in line with most of the relevant literature (see, e.g., Rebelo, 1991,
and Abel, 2007). An alternative way of focusing on distortionary e⁄ects is to assume that
revenue is rebated to taxpayers in order to eliminate income e⁄ects (Gordon, 1985).
8bond. Secondly, public spending has no direct impact on the private sector,
i.e., it a⁄ects neither the marginal utility of private consumption nor the ￿rm
productivity.
Given these assumptions, the after-tax cash ￿ ow, denoted as ￿￿ (t) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t), evolves as follows:
d￿￿ (t) = (1 ￿ ￿)d￿ (t) + ￿d￿ (t) (17)
= (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿dt + ￿
0
￿dW) + ￿d￿ (t):
Let us next ￿nd the depreciation rule that ensures neutrality in general
equilibrium. A priori, we do not know whether this neutral depreciation al-
lowance is deterministic or stochastic.13 Therefore, let us introduce a general
depreciation allowance that evolves as follows:
d￿ (t) = ￿￿ (t;￿)dt + ￿￿ (t;￿)
0 dW (t); (18)
where ￿￿ and ￿0
￿ are the unknown drift and volatility parameters, respec-
tively. We will therefore ￿nd the values of ￿￿ and ￿0
￿ that ensure neutrality.
Substituting (18) into (17) gives
d￿￿ (t) = (1 ￿ ￿)d￿ (t) + ￿d￿ (t) (19)





The equilibrium To complete the model we need a market-clearing con-
dition, according to which distributed dividends are fully consumed, i.e.,
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t) = c(t): (20)
Given the above assumptions, we can write the following:












dU0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t))















￿)((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + ￿￿￿)
1 ￿ ￿
;
13By assuming that the depreciation rule may be stochastic we let the government










U00 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿)
U0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿)
; (23)
K￿ ￿ ￿
U000 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿)
U0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿)
; (24)
where U0 (￿); U00 (￿) and U000 (￿) are the ￿rst, second and third derivative of
U (￿); respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A
In line with Du¢ e and Zame (1989), Proposition 1 shows that the spot
interest rate is given by the subjective discount rate minus the expected rate
of change in marginal utility (see the ￿rst line of Equation (21)). As can be
seen in the second and third lines of (21), the spot interest rate r depends
on consumer￿ s preferences (i.e., ￿ and the utility function) as well as on a
￿rm￿ s business activity (i.e., ￿￿ and ￿￿). In particular, r is given by three
terms. The ￿rst term is equal to the intertemporal rate of substitution,
divided by (1 ￿ ￿). The second and third terms account for the Arrow-Pratt
risk aversion measure A￿, and the third-order derivative of utility in K￿,
respectively. We can see that risk (measured by ￿￿) matters only if the third
derivative of the utility function (in K) does not equal zero. This is due to
the fact that U000 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿) allows us to measure the di⁄erence between
the expected and the actual marginal utility.14
14To understand how the third derivative of the utility function U (x) matters, let us
assume a stochastic variable that evolves as follows:
dx = ￿xdt + ￿xdW:
If we expand the utility function U (x + dx) in Taylor series around dx = 0 we have:









Rearranging and taking expectations gives
E
￿
U (x + dx) ￿ U (x)
dx
￿








As can be seen, the term U000 (x) matters only in a stochastic context (i.e., with ￿2
x 6= 0).
10As shown in Eq. (22), the equilibrium value of ￿ is given by the product








that measures a ￿rm￿ s after-tax volatility. In other words, the equilibrium
market price of risk is given by the product between cash ￿ ow risk and risk
aversion. Accordingly, the higher the risk aversion and/or the risk itself, the
higher the market price of risk is.
Given Proposition 1, we can now calculate the values of ￿￿ and ￿￿ that
ensure neutrality. We can thus prove the following:
Proposition 2 The depreciation rule ensuring tax invariance in general














































where A￿ and K￿ are as in (23) and (24), respectively, with A ￿ A￿j￿=0, and
K ￿ K￿j￿=0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 ￿nds the depreciation rule (i.e., the values of ￿￿ and ￿￿)
that makes both the interest rate and the market price of risk tax invariant.
As can be seen, this depreciation allowance is stochastic (i.e., ￿0
￿ 6= 0): this
means that the government must actively manage risk in order to achieve
neutrality.
If we compare, on the one hand (21) and (22), and on the other hand,
(25) and (26), we can see a parallel between the optimal depreciation rule
(￿￿, ￿￿) and the optimal prices (r, ￿). In particular, ￿ is proportional to
the after-tax cash ￿ ow volatility, and ￿￿ is proportional to the pre-tax cash
￿ ow volatility. Moreover, r and ￿￿ are both proportional to the sum between
the subjective discount rate (￿), the cash ￿ ow drift ￿￿, and the cash ￿ ow
variance ￿0
￿￿￿.
Let us next compare the JST rule of Equation (9) with the general-
equilibrium one, given by (25)-(26). We can prove that:
11Proposition 3 The general equilibrium rule (25)-(26) coincides with the
JST depreciation rule (9) if and only if
￿￿ = ￿￿; ￿￿ = ￿￿: (27)















Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 shows that the neutrality rule (25)-(26) di⁄ers from the
JST one, unless fairly restrictive conditions hold. As we can see, the rule
determined by (25) and (26) crucially depends on the functional form of
consumer￿ s utility, while the JST depreciation rule (9) does not. In particular,
Proposition 3 proves that the JST rule coincides with the general equilibrium
rule (25)-(26) if and only if conditions (27) hold or (which is the same) if and
only if conditions (27) hold. These two last conditions ask for the utility
function to have an ad hoc functional form. However, we can prove that:
Corollary 1 Conditions (28) and (29) do not hold if the utility function
belongs to the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) family.
Proof. See Appendix D.
According to Corollary 1, therefore, (28) and (29) are not met when
we use the most common forms of the utility function. In fact, Constant
Relative Risk Aversion, Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, log, and quadratic
utility functions can all be obtained as special cases of the more general
HARA function. To sum up, we can say that, according to Proposition 3
and Corollary 1, the JST rule cannot ensure neutrality in a realistic general-
equilibrium setting.
On the other hand, we must say that the neutral depreciation rule of
Proposition 2 is not a satisfactory solution, for two reasons. Firstly, the
amount of tax revenue that can be raised from a ￿rm by the general equilib-
rium tax rule (25)-(26) is nil. The reasoning behind this result is straight-
forward: conditions (27) require that the depreciation allowance must have
the same drift and di⁄usion terms as the cash ￿ ow. This implies that ￿ and
12￿ must coincide. In other words, the government must rebate everything it
raises with taxation (￿￿) to the ￿rm (￿￿) . Consequently, a ￿rm￿ s e⁄ective
tax burden is null.15 The second shortcoming of this neutrality rule is re-
lated to information requirements. As shown in Proposition 2, the neutral
tax rule (25)-(26) crucially depends on volatility and is therefore risk-speci￿c.
This means that, if more than one ￿rm operates, a ￿rm-speci￿c rule would
be required to achieve neutrality, unless ￿rms were all identical. Since this
neutral rule is informationally very demanding, a dramatic implementation
issue arises.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that the celebrated Johansson-Samuelson The-
orem may fail to hold in general equilibrium, unless harsh and unrealistic
assumptions are set. Moreover, we have discussed an alternative rule that
ensures neutrality in general equilibrium. However, this rule has two short-
comings. Firstly, it implies that the e⁄ective tax burden on ￿rms is nil and
secondly, it su⁄ers from implementation problems, in that it requires a huge
amount of information. We can therefore conclude that a neutral uniform-tax
system is harder to implement than usually thought.
15This zero-revenue result is similar to that obtained by Abel (2007) in a deterministic
context. Contrary to Abel (2007), however, this result does not depend on the technology
adopted.
13A Proof of Proposition 1
















































where U0 (￿) is the ￿rst derivative of function U. Since this ￿rst order con-
dition must hold for any state of the world, then we can set the integrand
function equal to zero (for any time t). Since the utility function is assumed
to be strictly increasing and concave, then the marginal utility is invertible











Equation (20) implies that in equilibrium consumption must be equal to
the after-tax dividend at any time. If we apply the marginal utility U0 (￿) to
both sides of the market-clearing Equation (20), we obtain
U
























￿(t￿t0) (1 ￿ ￿)￿
0dW;
14which can be written as
dU0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t))
U0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t))
= (￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r(t))dt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
0dW: (33)
Taking the expected value of Equation (33) and solving for r, gives
the ￿rst line of Equation (21). Furthermore, let us apply Ito￿ s lemma to
U0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t)). Using Equation (19) we have:
dU
0 ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (t) + ￿￿ (t)) (34)
= U









￿)((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + ￿￿￿)dt
+U





where U00 (￿) and U000 (￿) are the second and the third derivative of the utility
function, respectively.
Notice that Equations (33) and (34) must be identical. Therefore, we can
￿nd the equilibrium prices by equating the drift and di⁄usion components of































Using (35) and (36) one easily obtains (21) and (22). Proposition 1 is
thus proven.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let us calculate the values of ￿￿ and ￿￿ that ensure tax invariance of market
prices. Firstly, in order for ￿ to be una⁄ected by taxation, its value in (36)






























Using function (23) and setting A ￿ A￿j￿=0, we can rewrite (37) as (26).
Let us next focus on the interest rate. In order for the equality r￿ (t) =
r(t) to hold, we must set the equilibrium value of the spot interest rate in











































































Using the function (24), setting K ￿ K￿j￿=0, and rearranging (39) gives
(25). We have therefore obtained a tax policy (￿￿;￿￿) that ensures the tax
invariance of equilibrium market prices. Proposition 2 is thus proven.
C Proof of Proposition 3
As proven in Proposition 2, the depreciation rule (25)-(26) ensures the fol-
lowing equalities:





16We have already substituted the tax invariance value of ￿￿ previously obtained.




Since the after-tax cash ￿ ow ￿￿ evolves according to





we can therefore write its drift and di⁄usion terms as:
￿￿;￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + ￿￿￿;
￿
0





Substituting ￿r;￿, ￿r;￿, ￿￿;￿ and ￿￿;￿ into the JST depreciation rule (8) we
obtain
￿ (t) = r(t)V (t) ￿ ￿ (t) +
@V (t)
@￿ (t)




















Equation (40) coincides with the JST rule (9) if and only if
￿￿ = ￿￿;
￿￿ = ￿￿:
In particular, (40) is equal to (9) for any value of ￿ (t) and r(t), if and
only if the coe¢ cients of all the derivatives of V (t) are set equal to zero.
These coe¢ cients are zero if and only if ￿￿ = ￿￿ and ￿￿ = ￿￿.
Let us ￿nally ￿nd conditions (28) and (29). From Equation (26), we can





holds, where A￿ is as in (23) and A ￿ A￿j￿=0. Substituting this condition












where K￿ is as in (24) and K ￿ K￿j￿=0. This concludes the proof of Propo-
sition 3.￿
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where ￿ > 0, c > ￿￿
￿, while ￿ and ￿ are parameters. Function (41) belongs
to the so-called Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) family. It can
be traced back to the usual utility functions studied in the relevant literature
by using the following parameter combinations:






2. with ￿ = 1, and ￿ tending towards 0, we obtain an exponential utility





3. with ￿ = 0, ￿ = 1, and ￿ = 1, we obtain the log utility function:
U (c) = lnc;






Let us next calculate the ￿rst, second, and third derivatives of (41):
U





















￿ + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)c + ￿￿)
= 0;
which can be written as
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿
￿
c ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ = 0: (42)
Polynomial (42) is zero for any value of c if and only if all the coe¢ cients
of c are zero, i.e., ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿ = 0;
￿￿￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ = 0:
As we can see, the only solution (with ￿ 6= 0) is
￿ = 0; ￿ = 0:
However, the parameter ￿ can be zero only if ￿ = 1. This means that
condition (28) does not hold for any utility function generally used in the
literature.￿
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